2011-02-19, 05:43 PM
A former system admin or disgruntled employee with access to admin or secret accounts has no incentive to log in and cause mayhem. Doing so could jeopardize his whole career as all businesses like to talk to former bosses, and as you climb up the food chain the reason for leaving your previous job becomes more and more important. Also, any half-assed sysadmin is going to create logs which show who logged in from where and what all was performed on admin accounts. That's basic security protocol. It's not too hard to use a little computer forensics to figure out who compromised the system and go after him for tampering with their data.
So, it boils down to this:
1. The company in question does not have a security protocol in place dealing with firing of leadership in regards to passwords, permissions, and notes about the system.
2. The employee was stupid enough to actually compromise corporate data.
A corporation has no incentive to state that user information was compromised by a disgruntled employee. That reflects poorly on the company in many ways. So, instead, there's just silence.
So, it boils down to this:
1. The company in question does not have a security protocol in place dealing with firing of leadership in regards to passwords, permissions, and notes about the system.
2. The employee was stupid enough to actually compromise corporate data.
A corporation has no incentive to state that user information was compromised by a disgruntled employee. That reflects poorly on the company in many ways. So, instead, there's just silence.